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INTRODUCTION
Sunlight is the best disinfectant, Justice Brandeis famously declared, prais-
ing publicity as a remedy for corruption.' But sunlight is more than that; it is an
indispensable precondition of life. And to extend the Brandeis metaphor,
sunlight in the form of robust public access to government information is es-
sential to the vitality of democratic governance, even in the absence of corrup-
tion. Our political institutions cannot function properly without it.
Whether it concerns matters of high policy, such as the decision to go to
war, or the smallest allocation of taxpayer funds, the free flow of information to
interested members of the public is a prerequisite to their participation in the
deliberative process and to their ability to hold elected officials accountable. Of
course, public disclosure of government information is not the only ingredient
needed to sustain a vital democracy, and disclosure has always been condi-
tioned on security, privacy, and other considerations. But without it, citizens
are deprived of a meaningful role in the political process, and the exercise of au-
thority is insulated from public oversight and control.
Ensuring appropriate public access to government information, while es-
tablishing proper boundaries around the exercise of official secrecy, has proved
to be an elusive goal. The expansive secrecy practices of recent years appear to
have enhanced the case for a new approach by illustrating the unintentional
costs of secrecy, as well as its corrosive effects on government performance and
public confidence. For example, as former Justice Department official Jack L.
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1. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, re-
printed in Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS
USE IT 92, 92 (1932) ("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman.").
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Goldsmith told Congress: "There's no doubt that the extreme secrecy [associ-
ated with the Bush Administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program] ... led to
a lot of mistakes."' More prosaically, even agency telephone directories have
been removed from public access, along with numerous other categories of use-
ful and formerly public information.' Not only civil libertarians and public in-
terest activists, but also defense and intelligence officials, now say that secrecy
has gone too far and must be restrained. In particular, the classification system
that restricts access to government information on national security grounds
clearly is not serving its intended purpose. It has become an unwarranted obsta-
cle to information-sharing inside and outside the government, to the detriment
of public policy.
The "classification system is broken and is a barrier (and often an excuse)
for not sharing pertinent information with homeland security partners," ac-
cording to the Homeland Security Advisory Council, chaired by former FBI Di-
rector and former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Webster.4
Others have independently reached identical conclusions. Stephen E. Flynn of
the Council on Foreign Relations opined at a 2008 congressional hearing that
"on the classification issue, there is just no question that the system is broken,
fundamentally broken."5 Mr. Flynn observed further that "[blecause things get
routinely overclassified, they can't get to the people who need [them]."6
Concerns about excessive government secrecy have accompanied the na-
tional security classification system for decades. An official review in 1956 com-
plained that, "overclassification has reached serious proportions. '7 Entire
shelves of commission reports, congressional hearings, and independent cri-
tiques since then have blasted official secrecy for improperly shielding govern-
2. Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, noth Cong. 9 (2007) (statement of Jack L. Goldsmith,
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
3. Steven Aftergood, The Age of Missing Information, SLATE, Mar. 17, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2114963/.
4. HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, Top TEN CHALLENGES FACING THE NEXT
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY 8 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/dhs/topten.pdf.
5. The Resilient Homeland: How DHS Intelligence Should Empower America To Pre-
pare for, Prevent, and Withstand Terrorist Attacks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intelligence, Info. Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., noth Cong. 26 (2008) (statement of Stephen E. Flynn, Senior Fel-
low, Council on Foreign Relations).
6. Id.
7. DEF. DEP'T COMM. ON CLASSIFIED INFO., REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BY THE COMMITTEE ON CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 6 (1956), available at
http://www.thememoryhole.org/foi/coolidge-committee.pdf [hereinafter COM-
MITTEE ON CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REPORT].
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ment operations from the public, impeding oversight, covering up malfeasance,
and, ultimately, undermining national security itself.'
Successive waves of critics have rarely succeeded in devising effective solu-
tions or strategies to mitigate the defective secrecy practices that they oppose.
The persistent failure to achieve significant reforms over half a century suggests
that these critics have not properly formulated their critiques or articulated rec-
ommendations in a way that would enable systemic changes. In recent years, in
fact, classification-specifically overclassification-has increased, not dimin-
ished.
On the other hand, despite the fairly dismal record of the past fifty years, a
small number of secrecy reform initiatives have yielded measurable differences
in official secrecy policy, reducing the scope of classification activity, and in-
creasing the pace of declassification. Why did those isolated efforts succeed?
Can they be distinguished from the other well-intentioned initiatives that ulti-
mately failed? Do they hold lessons for today's potential reformers? This Essay
seeks to identify the salient characteristics of successful secrecy reform programs
in order to explain their successes and to inform future reform efforts. The fol-
lowing Part introduces national security secrecy, including its structure and op-
eration, along with an explanation of its problematic features. Part II reviews
the singularly unproductive history of efforts to reform and rationalize secrecy
policy. Parts III and IV examine exceptions to this otherwise dismal history, in
which significant reforms were accomplished with meaningful results. The re-
mainder of the Essay proposes lessons for the future that may be derived from
these successes.
I. THE BASICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY SECRECY
The purpose of the classification system is to prevent disclosure of informa-
tion that could damage our national security. This straightforward definition,
however, begs several questions: What is national security, if not the vitality of
its democratic institutions that would be hobbled by secrecy? What constitutes
damage? Who decides?
Even the architects and devotees of national security secrecy implicitly ac-
knowledge that it represents a departure from the norms of democratic govern-
ance. In his 2003 executive order on classification policy, President George W.
Bush affirmed both the norm and the departure:
8. Among the most thoughtful and substantive reviews was that of the congression-
ally-mandated Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy,
chaired by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. Doc. No. 105-2 (1997),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html [hereinafter
MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT]; see also Federation of American Scientists Pro-
ject on Government Secrecy, Secrecy and Security Library, http://
www.fas.org/sgp/library/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (listing noteworthy
reports on government secrecy).
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Our democratic principles require that the American people be in-
formed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation's pro-
gress depends on the free flow of information. Nevertheless, through-
out our history, the national defense has required that certain
information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citi-
zens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our in-
teractions with foreign nations. Protecting information critical to our
Nation's security remains a priority.9
The presidential "nevertheless," which qualifies and limits the "free flow of
information," has by now justified an enormous bureaucracy that implements
and sustains the government secrecy system. By 2008, classification activity had
increased to a total of more than 23 million classification actions per year.'° The
most recent reported cost of protecting classified information in government
and industry was a record annual high of $9.9 billion in 2007." Untold billions
of pages of government records, some dating back to World War I, have re-
mained inaccessible to the public on asserted national security grounds, and
fateful government deliberations on questions of war and peace, human rights,
and domestic surveillance have increasingly moved beyond public ken.
In practice, it is possible to distinguish at least three distinct categories of
government secrecy. The first, "genuine national security secrecy," works to
protect information that would pose an identifiable threat to the security of the
nation by compromising its defense or the conduct of its foreign relations. Such
information could include design details of weapons of mass destruction and
other advanced military or intelligence technologies, current military opera-
tional plans, identities of intelligence sources, confidential diplomatic initia-
tives, and similarly sensitive matters. Protection of such information is not con-
troversial. These safeguards are the raison d'&tre of the classification system, and
the public interest is served when this type of information remains secure.
A second category that often masks itself as genuine national security se-
crecy, however, is actually something quite different. One might deem this ver-
sion "bureaucratic secrecy." It reflects that natural tendency of bureaucracies,
famously identified by Max Weber, to hoard information."2 Whether out of
convenience or a dim suspicion that disclosure is intrinsically riskier than non-
9. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003).
10. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2008 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/20o8-annual-report.pdf [hereinafter
2008 OVERSIGHT OFFICE REPORT].
11. INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2007 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 28 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2007-annual-report.pdf.
12. Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in EssAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 233-34 (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946) ("Every bureaucracy seeks to
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disclosure, government agencies always seem to err on the side of secrecy even
when there is no obvious advantage to doing so.
When asked how much defense information in government is overclassi-
fled or unnecessarily classified, former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelli-
gence Carol A. Haave told a House subcommittee in 2004 that it could be as
much as fifty percent, an astonishingly high figure. 3 Former Information Secu-
rity Oversight Office Director J. William Leonard added: "I would put it almost
even beyond 50/5o .... [T]here's over 50 percent of the information that, while
it may meet the criteria for classification, really should not be classified .... ""14
"It may very well be that a lot of information is classified that shouldn't be,"
admitted Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a 2004 news conference, "or
it's classified for a period longer than it should be."' 5 Yet these official acknowl-
edgments of unnecessary secrecy have not prompted any reversal of course. In
fact, the pace of classification activity has continued to increase each year, a
tribute to the bureaucratic impulse.
The third category of secrecy, "political secrecy," uses classification author-
ity for political advantage. While probably the smallest in quantitative terms,
this form of secrecy is actually the most problematic and objectionable. It ex-
ploits the generally accepted legitimacy of genuine national security interests in
order to advance a self-serving agenda, to evade controversy, or to thwart ac-
countability. In extreme cases, political secrecy conceals violations of law and
threatens the integrity of the political process itself.
In one unusually explicit example of the practice, a 1947 Atomic Energy
Commission memorandum concerning "Medical Experiments on Humans"
instructed as follows: "It is desired that no document be released which refers to
experiments with humans and might have adverse effect on public opinion or
result in legal suits. Documents covering such work.., should be classified
'secret."".6 This is by no means the only example of political secrecy. The CIA
notoriously concealed the use of hallucinogens and other behavior-altering sub-
stances on unsuspecting persons in a behavior modification program code-
named MKULTRA, and the Department of Energy hid the deliberate exposure
of unwitting subjects to radiation in the early Cold War era. More recently, the
Bush Administration secretly conducted domestic surveillance outside the
13. Too Many Secrets: Overclassification as a Barrier to Critical Information Sharing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats and Int'l Relations of
the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, io8th Cong. 82 (2005) (statement of Carol A.
Haave, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence).
14. Id. 83 (2005) (statement of J. William Leonard, Director, Information Security
Oversight Office).
15. Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def., Press Conference in Phoenix,
Arizona (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2714.
16. U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMM'N, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS 1 (1947),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/aec947.pdf.
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statutory framework and performed interrogations subjecting suspected enemy
combatants to extreme mental and physical pain. As these examples show, po-
litical secrecy is often used to circumvent the institutions of law rather than to
protect them.
If all government secrecy actions were uniformly bad or abusive, the public
policy solution would be simple: to eliminate secrecy. If all government secrecy
actions were necessary or prudent, no solution would be required, since there
would be no problem. But in practice, government secrecy seems to be com-
prised of a shifting mix of the legitimate and the illegitimate. Genuine national
security secrecy is diluted in an ocean of unnecessary bureaucratic secrets and
defamed from time to time by abuse in the form of political secrecy. The endur-
ing public policy problem is to disentangle the legitimate from the illegitimate,
preserving the former and exposing the latter.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECRECY REFORM
Over the past fifty years, generations of critics have risen to attack, bemoan,
lampoon, and correct the excesses of government secrecy. Only rarely have they
had a measurable and constructive impact.
The 1956 Coolidge Committee, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense
Charles Coolidge, identified widespread overclassification that it attributed to
vague classification standards and lack of any associated accountability or pun-
ishment. The Coolidge Committee recommended the creation of a Director for
Declassification within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a reduction in
the number of authorized classifiers.'7 There is no record that these suggestions
were ever adopted.
The 197o Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy concluded that the
amount of scientific and technical information that is classified "could profita-
bly be decreased perhaps as much as 90 percent .... "" The Task Force recom-
mended a maximum classification lifetime of five years for most scientific and
technical information and declassification of most currently classified technical
information within two years. 9 These recommendations were ignored.
The 1985 Stilwell Commission, chaired by the late Army General Richard G.
Stilwell, again found that "too much information appears to be classified and
much at higher levels than is warranted." 0 From this commission's optimistic
perspective, "[t]he remedy is straightforward: disciplined compliance with the
17. COMMITTEE ON CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REPORT, supra note 7 at 6, 13-14.
18. DEF. SCI. BD., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
SECRECY, at v (1970), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dsbrep.pdf.
19. Id. at 2.
20. COMM'N To REvIEw DOD SEC. POLICY AND PRACTICES, KEEPING THE NATION'S
SECRETS 49 (1985).
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rules."'" Straightforward or not, however, the Commission's advice had no dis-
cernable impact on the problem.
The 1994 Joint Security Commission reported to the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI that, "the classification system, largely unchanged since the Eisen-
hower administration, has grown out of control."22 Not only that, but "the clas-
sification system is not trusted on the inside any more than it is trusted on the
outside. Insiders do not trust it to protect information that needs protection.
Outsiders do not trust it to release information that does not need protec-
tion."2" The Joint Security Commission recommended adoption of a single clas-
sification level (offering two degrees of protection) to replace the existing three-
level system.24 This recommendation was not accepted.
The 1997 Moynihan Commission, chaired by the late Senator Daniel P.
Moynihan, found that the secrecy system "is used too often to deny the public
an understanding of the policymaking process .... There needs to be some
check on the unrestrained discretion to create secrets."" Toward that end, the
Moynihan Commission recommended adopting legislation that would clearly
define what may or may not be classified. 6 Such legislation was introduced in
Congress, but it expired without a vote.
The 9/11 Commission also singled out secrecy as a problem, created to in-
vestigate the terrorist attacks of September ii, 2OOl and to derive the public pol-
icy lessons that might be learned from them. The Commission explained in its
2004 final report that, "[c]urrent security requirements nurture overclassifica-
tion and excessive compartmentation of information among agencies." 7 The
Commission recommended legislation to disclose the budgets of intelligence
agencies and called for new incentives to reward information sharing.2" In this
case, the recommendations were largely accepted. Legislation to require disclo-
sure of the intelligence budget total (though not the budgets of individual agen-
cies) was enacted, and effective steps were taken to improve information shar-
21. Id. at 50.
22. JOINT SEC. COMM'N, REDEFINING SECURITY: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE AND THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 6 (1994), available at
http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/jsc-report.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 77.
25. MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at xxi-xxii.
26. Id. at xxii.
27. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 417 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/91/report/
9lReport.pdf.
28. Id. at 416-17.
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ing among government agencies.2 9 But the problem of systemic overclassifica-
tion was unaffected.
Of course, not even the briefest account of secrecy reform's history could
fail to mention the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which gave legal force
to public requests for government information. The Act mandated the release
of classified information upon request unless it was "properly classified." 0
FOIA has been used successfully over the years to challenge the classification of
particular records and to dislodge mountains of government documents (classi-
fied and unclassified) that would otherwise not have been released. But at its
best, FOIA only facilitates access to specific records; it does not and cannot alter
the practices and procedures that make them inaccessible in the first place.
Thus, indispensable as it was and remains, FOIA did not provide an effective
remedy for the excesses of government secrecy that were identified by the vari-
ous secrecy reform efforts that preceded and followed the Act's passage in 1966.
Other targeted initiatives have likewise fallen short of systemic reform but
did generate some success. The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec-
tion Act3 and the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act32 each led to the declassifica-
tion of significant bodies of historical records. President Clinton's 1995 execu-
tive order, which aimed to set a twenty-five-year lifetime for most classified
documents,33 led to the declassification of approximately a billion pages of his-
torically valuable records.3 4
Yet these achievements, while intrinsically valuable and a boon to histori-
ans, did nothing to restrain the scope of current classification activity or to
promote public access to contemporary records that were unnecessarily with-
held. In that respect, the continuity of the complaints voiced by critics of gov-
ernment secrecy over the period reviewed in this Part is striking. Despite the in-
tellectual firepower brought to bear and the political effort that was invested,
very little has changed with respect to classification policy. The 1997 Moynihan
Commission report stated with unusual self-awareness: "We started our work
with the knowledge that many commissions and reports on government secrecy
have preceded us, with little impact on the problems we still see and on the new
29. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
30. Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2000).
31. President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44
U.S.C. § 2107 (2000).
32. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
33. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995).
34. See, e.g., PUB. INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BD., IMPROVING DECLASSIFICATION 5
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ones we have found."35 More than a decade later, the same may unfortunately
be said of that commission and its report.
And yet, there are some remarkable exceptions to this discouraging record,
namely secrecy reform proposals that produced results that were both tangible
and instructive. Closer consideration of these exceptions provides practical
guidance for contemporary efforts to control government secrecy.
III. THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL
One example of a successful secrecy reform was an unexpectedly effective
new procedure for reconsidering agency decisions not to declassify and release a
document. Executive Order 12,958 established a little-known Interagency Secu-
rity Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) to consider appeals from members of
the public whose requests for declassification review had been denied. 6 Even
those who devised the ISCAP scheme did not anticipate how well it would per-
form its assigned task.
The ISCAP is composed exclusively of executive branch officials, including
representatives of the major national security agencies that are the most prolific
classifiers: the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice; the CIA; the National
Security Council; and the National Archives and Records Administration.
Bringing these classifiers together to review individual agency classification de-
cisions did not appear to be a radical innovation. But to the surprise of many
observers, the ISCAP has proved to be an exceptionally independent and effec-
tive check on individual executive branch agency classification practices.
Incredibly, the ISCAP has voted more often than not to declassify records
that the originating agency had refused to declassify. Between May 1996 and
September 2008, the ISCAP considered appeals concerning 769 documents, and
voted to declassify, in whole or in part, 495 of them. 7 In other words, the Panel
overruled the classification position of one of its own member agencies in a
clear majority (64%) of the cases that were presented to it.
By comparison, one may note that federal courts, which have adopted a
deferential posture to the executive branch on national security matters, almost
never overturn agency classification decisions. There are no more than a few
dozen FOIA cases over the past thirty years in which an agency's assertion of a
classification exemption has been overruled by a court. Even then the decision
was reached primarily on technical rather than substantive grounds."
35. MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at xxii.
36. Classified National Security Information, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,285 (Apr. 20, 1995).
37. 2008 OVERSIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note io, at 19-20.
38. A Department of Justice tally identified only eighteen cases from 1979 to 1995 in
which a court ordered disclosure of classified information, and several of those
were reversed on appeal. Office of Info. Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Litigation
Review: History of Exemption 1 Disclosure Orders, 16 FOIA UPDATE 4 (1995),
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Reflecting on the ISCAP's record of granting appeals to declassify agency
records, ISCAP Chair Roslyn A. Mazer averred in 1998: "I am confident that
had just about all of these appeals been brought before the federal courts under
the Freedom of Information Act, the appellant would not have prevailed, and
the information would have remained classified unless the agency itself decided
to declassify it."39 But under its own much more forthcoming procedures,
ISCAP declassified the contested information. 4°
The ISCAP soon became such a potent tool for challenging classification er-
rors that one member agency, the CIA, sought relief from its jurisdiction. At
first the CIA was unsuccessful. In 1999, the Justice Department Office of Legal
Counsel produced an opinion that concluded that, contrary to the CIA's posi-
tion, "the DCI's [classification] determinations are subject to substantive ISCAP
review." 4' But then in 2003, the CIA requested and received the authority from
President George W. Bush to veto ISCAP decisions declassifying and disclosing
CIA information. 42 Such CIA vetoes of ISCAP decisions have been exercised in
two reported cases. 43 In recent years, the Panel has amassed a backlog of pend-
ing appeals, and it has never had the capacity to address more than a handful of
classification challenges. But the ISCAP still retains its overall track record of
voting to release information in the majority of classified documents presented
to it.44
What does the success of this program tell us? I believe that the actions of
the ISCAP can best be understood in terms of the three categories of classified
information described above: genuine national security secrecy, bureaucratic
secrecy, and political secrecy. The ISCAP structure offers a way to winnow out
the latter illegitimate forms of secrecy, while preserving its legitimate applica-
tions to justifiable ends.
All member agencies within the ISCAP share a commitment to genuine na-
tional security secrecy, i.e., the use of classification authority to protect legiti-
mate secrets, and they have affirmed such secrecy whenever they encountered it.
Former ISCAP Chair Mazer noted, for example, that, "[the ISCAP] member-
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia.updates/VolXVI_2/page4.htm (last
visited Apr. 15, 2009).
39. Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Sec. Classification Appeals Panel, Remarks at
the Meeting of the Department of Defense Historical Records Declassification
Advisory Panel (Mar. 6, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory
iscap/iscapo398.html.
40. Id.
41. Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, to Steven
Garfinkel, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office (Oct. 5, 1999), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap/olc-opinion.html.
42. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 § 5.3(f) (2003).
43. See 2008 OVERSIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note lo, at 20.
44. Id. at 19-20.
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ship has consistently voted to retain classification of information that would
identify a human intelligence source, even after thirty-plus years." 45 But even
though all of the member agencies may also practice their own illegitimate bu-
reaucratic and political forms of secrecy, they evidently have no self-interest at
stake in the bureaucratic or political uses of secrecy by other individual agen-
cies. It turns out that they also have no patience for these activities. No federal
judge or other external oversight body has been as ruthlessly effective in over-
turning unjustified classification actions as the ISCAP.46
Essentially, the ISCAP process extended declassification authority beyond
the agency that classified the information. In doing so, it removed bureaucratic
and political self-interest from the equation, making it possible to distinguish
legitimate national security secrecy from its impostors and to strip away the lat-
ter. This extension of declassification authority, though it may offend the
autonomy of individual agencies, has improved the functioning of the overall
classification system and is likely to have many other applications.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL CLASSIFICATION POLICY REVIEW
Another rare innovation in government secrecy policy that produced ex-
ceptional results was the Fundamental Classification Policy Review (FCPR) un-
dertaken by the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1995. 47 This process repre-
sented a dedicated effort to review, revise, and update the department's
classification guides-the templates for applying classification controls-with
the declared intention of reducing the scope of DoE classification.
4s
The FCPR emerged from the "Openness Initiative" led by Energy Secretary
Hazel O'Leary. It was a bold effort to reverse the excesses of Cold War secrecy,
to modernize the department's security policies, and to rebuild flagging public
confidence in DoE management of the troubled nuclear weapons complex. Sec-
retary O'Leary declassified the complete list of U.S. nuclear explosive tests, re-
leased information on the history of U.S. production of plutonium and highly
45. Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Sec. Classification Appeals Panel, Remarks at
the Joint Intelligence Community Information and Classification Management
Conference (Nov. 2, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap/
mazer98.html.
46. Courts have been reluctant to challenge executive branch secrecy judgments "for
separation of powers reasons, for fear of becoming enmeshed in political ques-
tions, and out of concern that the judiciary lacks the expertise to reach appropri-
ate decisions in these areas." Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts
Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 158 (2006).
But these concerns are not well founded. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the courts'
concerns lack a strong basis).
47. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CLASSIFICATION POLICY
REVIEW GROUP (1997) [hereinafter FCPR REPORT].
48. Id. at 3-4.
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enriched uranium, and authorized release of previously classified aspects of in-
ertial confinement fusion technology.
One of the more interesting aspects of the FCPR was the way in which it
tackled the agency's entire classification infrastructure through an unprece-
dented systematic critical examination. The mission of the FCPR was to deter-
mine "what information must continue to be protected... [and] which infor-
mation no longer requires protection and should be made available to the
public .... -149 Among the guiding principles was the view that, "[cilassification
must be based on explainable judgments of identifiable risk to national security
and no other reason.""° Thus, "an identified benefit or need is not required to
justify declassification and release to the public. Rather, the federal government
must establish the reason for classification." 5'
The FCPR was conducted over a one-year period by fifty technical experts
from the DoE, national laboratories, and other agencies, divided into seven
topical working groups. The reviewers examined thousands of topics in hun-
dreds of DoE classification guides, evaluated their continued relevance, and
formulated recommendations for change. Significantly, public input was ac-
tively solicited at every stage of the process, from identification of the issues to
review of the final draft recommendations. Following their year-long delibera-
tions, the reviewers concluded that hundreds of categories of classified DoE in-
formation should be declassified. In some cases, they recommended increased
protection for particularly sensitive categories of information. In large part, the
reviewers' recommendations were adopted in practice. 2
Other attempted secrecy reform initiatives tended to use general terms in
outlining desired outcomes (e.g., more openness or less classification) or inter-
mediate steps (e.g., legislation or a new executive order). But the FCPR distin-
guished itself by directly examining the decision to classify thousands of specific
categories of information. The reviewers essentially queried: Were those deci-
sions justifiable on genuine national security grounds? If so, they would be up-
held. If not, the reviewer would eliminate them.
But perhaps the most remarkable feature of this exercise was that it mobi-
lized the DoE bureaucracy itself as an agent of secrecy reform and not merely as its
object. The defense mechanisms that would normally be triggered in response to
legislative intervention or FOIA litigation--delay, defiance, or mere pro forma
compliance-for the most part did not materialize. Instead, the DoE secrecy
bureaucracy was effectively reprogrammed with a new mission: reduce secrecy
49. FCPR REPORT, supra note 47, app. A at A-1.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id. at 17 n.12.
52. Some declassification recommendations, like the disclosure of locations of his-
torical nuclear weapons depots abroad, were blocked by the Department of De-
fense. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Fact Sheet: Proposed Declassification of the [Loca-
tions of Former Nuclear Weapons Storage] Sites, http://www.fas.org/sgp/
othergov/doe/fs.sites.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
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to the minimum necessary. That objective was satisfied to an unprecedented
extent.
V. THE SECRETS OF EFFECTIVE SECRECY REFORM
Against the desolate backdrop of futile criticism of government secrecy pol-
icy that has persisted for decades, the comparatively successful initiatives de-
scribed above allow some inferences to be drawn regarding the elements of suc-
cessful secrecy reform that could be applied in the future.
A. Secrecy Reform Is Best Pursued at the Agency Level
Practical secrecy reform is most effectively pursued at the agency level,
where secrecy is actually implemented, rather than through abstract or horta-
tory government-wide statements of policy. The classification issues that arise
in each major national security agency are substantively different, as are the as-
sociated security cultures. Intelligence agencies are concerned above all with the
protection of sources and methods. Military agencies, for example, focus on the
security of weapons technology and operational plans. Foreign policy agencies,
on the other hand, must weigh the international impacts of classification and
declassification.
Each agency that classifies information maintains its own classification
guides, specifying in detail exactly what information may be classified and at
what level. Furthermore, each agency is prone to overclassify different types of
material. It follows that a successful retooling of the classification system must
be undertaken where the real classification activity takes place: at the agency
level, as the Energy Department's FCPR shows. It is true that revisions to an ex-
ecutive order on classification can signal new directions for the entire executive
branch and impose new limits, which are both desirable and necessary. But all
such revisions will still need to be translated into concrete procedures.
Despite the centrality of individual agency secrecy procedures, they have
been seriously neglected by overseers and reformers. A large fraction of agency
classification guides have not been reviewed or updated for years, dating back to
before the Bush administration's 2003 revisions to classification policy. "Over-
all, 67 percent of the guides agencies reported as being currently in use had not
been updated within the past five years," according to the Information Security
Oversight Office." This means that obsolete secrecy practices are being perpetu-
ated automatically. Therefore, the single most productive secrecy reform action
that could now be undertaken would be to conduct the equivalent of the Funda-
mental Classification Policy Review at each one of the major classifying agencies. In
other words, the president could achieve a systematic reduction in government
secrecy by directing each agency that classifies information to conduct a de-
tailed public review of its classification policies with the objective of reducing
secrecy to the essential minimum and declassifying everything that does not
53. 2008 OVERSIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note lo, at 23.
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meet the standard for classification. Crucially, as with the DoE's FCPR, the
agencies themselves would be tasked to lead the secrecy reform process, not
simply to endure it passively. Harnessing the bureaucracy in this way minimizes
the likelihood of institutional foot-dragging or even sabotage. It could also pro-
duce some constructive tension among agencies, as they compete to see which
can implement the president's directive most effectively and which can generate
the most significant reforms.
B. Extend Declassification Authority Beyond the Originating Agencies
If the task of secrecy reform is to disentangle legitimate from illegitimate
secrecy and to uphold genuine national security secrecy while reducing and
eliminating bureaucratic and political secrecy, then the track record of the
ISCAP suggests that the most practical and effective method is to extend declas-
sification authority beyond the agency in which it originated. This is the best
way to nullify agency self-interest and purge it from the classification process.
This notion is generally abhorrent to most agencies, which doubt that other
federal agencies can truly appreciate the sensitivity of "their" information. The
CIA felt so strongly about the possibility that other agencies might order release
of its information that it successfully petitioned the President for the authority
to veto ISCAP decisions requiring the CIA to declassify information against its
will. Nonetheless, something along these lines is essential to break down the
self-serving barriers to disclosure produced by bureaucratic, illegitimate secrecy.
If one executive branch agency cannot successfully explain to a senior official
from another executive branch agency why the national security requires that a
certain item be classified, then there is reason to doubt the necessity of its con-
tinued secrecy.
There is a dawning awareness that the days of unilateral agency control of
information must come to a close. At his 2007 confirmation hearing to become
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Lieutenant General James R. Clap-
per concurred with the statement that "the information gathered by the various
[intelligence] collection agencies, such as CIA, NSA, and DIA, is not 'owned' by
those agencies, and those agencies [should] not control decisions about who
should get access to collected information. '54 But, he added, those decisions
should be controlled by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Such
change would constitute real progress, though it stops short of addressing over-
classification in the Office of the DNI.
C. Encourage Experimentation and Pilot Projects
A qualitatively new twenty-first century information security policy that
truly serves the national interest will not emerge spontaneously. Rather, it must
54. Nominations: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs. on Nominations, l1oth
Cong. 465 (2008) (prepared response of James R. Clapper, Jr., Lieutenant General
(Ret.), U.S. Air Force).
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be approached incrementally in order to win acceptance and to correct initial
errors. The process likely will start modestly in one corner of the government
and then expand. The possibility of such innovations in security policy should
be actively cultivated and encouraged through an officially sanctioned pilot
program.
Security policy thus far has tended to be something of an intellectual back-
water, where conformity and obedience are prized above all. These qualities
have their place, but they need to be leavened by innovation and alertness to the
lessons of experience. Small-scale tests of new approaches to information secu-
rity could be explored at the individual program and agency level, and could be
overseen and nurtured by the Obama Administration's new Chief Technology
Officer, who is charged with, among other things, promoting transparency.
55
Almost by definition, innovation cannot be prescribed or institutionalized
easily, but it can be rewarded and emulated where appropriate. Successful
secrecy reform initiatives such as the FCPR and the ISCAP both began on a lim-
ited scale as experiments whose outcomes were uncertain. The FCPR was a one-
year process within a single agency. The ISCAP is a low-activity operation that
usually meets no more than once per month to consider only one or two dozen
cases per year. More experiments and pilot projects in modifying classification
policy are needed.
A fundamental transformation of the entire government secrecy system
may be out of reach, at least as long as there is no consensus about what form it
should take. But a series of small-scale experiments could help shape such a
consensus and point to a new direction for the future. What if an agency or a
program manager decided to treat documents marked "Confidential" (the low-
est of the three classification levels) as unclassified? What if the inspector gen-
eral at each agency were granted authority to declassify or downgrade any clas-
sified document in the agency that he or she concluded no longer required
classification? What if all newly declassified documents in one agency were im-
mediately scanned and placed on the agency's website? Tests along these lines
could be conducted on a limited scale and in such a way that, even if they went
astray, would not incur much damage or expense. No matter the outcome,
however, such efforts should provide valuable new insight into the process of
innovation in security policy. Many such experiments are possible, and a few
might succeed.
D. The Importance of Leadership
The last lesson that emerges from the intermittent success of secrecy reform
is the essential role of high-level leadership. Any agency head might have under-
taken an initiative akin to the FCPR, but only Secretary O'Leary did so. The
Openness Initiative that she launched seems to have been attributable to idio-
55. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A FEDERAL CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER IN THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: OPTIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 1 (2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R4o15o.pdf.
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syncratic factors as much as any others. It was true, as she said, that President
Clinton had declared: "The more the American people know about their gov-
ernment the better they will be governed." 6 Though Clinton directed that mes-
sage to the entire executive branch, Secretary O'Leary was the only one of all the
Clinton Administration agency heads who acted on it in a serious and system-
atic way.
Her actions reflect the Reagan-era maxim: "personnel is policy.""7 In other
words, the choice and placement of competent, motivated government employ-
ees is at least as important and influential as the wording of any particular pol-
icy statement. Dedicated and skillful personnel can flourish even in a policy
vacuum, while obstructionist or incompetent persons can frustrate the most
carefully conceived plans. We live in a democracy, but not all of us are "democ-
rats" by instinct or inclination. That is to say, not all of us are equally commit-
ted to open, accountable government or to constructive engagement with
members of the public. Indeed, some are actually quite hostile to such interac-
tion.
A year ago, I requested a copy of a specific unclassified document from the
CIA under FOIA. Despite repeated inquiries, the CIA FOIA staff would not ac-
knowledge receipt of the request for six months. Even months later, this simple
request remained open-neither granted nor denied. By contrast, a member of
the FOIA staff at the Office of the DNI recently alerted me to the availability of
a document that I had not even requested, because she knew I was interested in
the subject. The basic difference in orientation reflected in these two encounters
cannot be located in specific agency regulations or guidelines. It is a matter of
personal characters and attitudes. And so, to a large extent, good personnel will
produce good results. This is more easily stated than implemented. Improving
the quality of the government workforce is a challenge for many reasons, in-
cluding financial, educational, and demographic considerations.
When it comes to secrecy reform, though, improvements can be encour-
aged through employee performance evaluations that reward proper disclosure
and through care in the nomination and confirmation process to select those
individuals who truly value open government and limited secrecy. Fortunately,
the most senior official of all-the President of the United States-has em-
braced open government as a guiding principle. "Starting today," President
Obama remarked on his first full day in office, "every agency and department
should know that this administration stands on the side not of those who seek
to withhold information, but those who seek to make it known." ' As a result of
this confluence of circumstances and personal commitments, there is now fer-
tile ground for a transformation of inherited secrecy practices.
56. FCPR REPORT, supra note 47, at 3.
57. See, e.g., David Frum, Personnel Is Policy, NAT'L REv., Oct. 24, 2005, at 17.
58. President Barack Obama, Remarks to White House Senior Staff, 12 DAILY COMP.
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CONCLUSION
Even in the inner chambers of the national security bureaucracy, it is now
acknowledged that the secrecy system is dysfunctional and that its basic con-
cepts are open to question. Remarkably, after more than fifty years of imple-
menting national security classification policy, an internal Intelligence Com-
munity study admitted that, "[t]he definitions of 'national security' and what
constitutes 'intelligence'-and thus what must be classified-are unclear."59
And so, unsurprisingly, the application of those definitions in practice produces
murky results.
There is no disagreement in any domain that robust public access to gov-
ernment information is an essential characteristic of a vital democracy. Nor, on
the other hand, is there any dispute that some types of government information
require protection on national security grounds. Beyond these points, however,
consensus gives way to confusion, inertia, and the weight of past practice. In
2007 and 2008, for example, the total budget for the National Intelligence Pro-
gram was declassified, pursuant to legislation recommended by the 9/11 Com-
mission. But earlier this year, the DNI rejected a request for disclosure of the
2006 intelligence budget total, declaring that it is properly classified.6 How can
that be, when more recent information is freely disclosed? No sensible answer is
forthcoming.
As a result of this incoherence and the mounting dissatisfaction with classi-
fication policy, the government secrecy system is now ripe for reform. The
Obama Administration's emphatic commitment to "creating an unprecedented
level of openness in Government '1 61 provides the needed impetus for the reform
process. If current reform efforts are to succeed, this Essay has argued that to-
day's reformers must recognize the failures of the past and learn the lessons of
our occasional successes. Rhetorical statements of principle are fine and neces-
sary. In order to change classification practice, though, it will be necessary to
revise the classification process itself.
The alternative to indiscriminate secrecy is not indiscriminate openness.
Rather, the new Administration should undertake a thoughtful, critical, and
open review of individual agency classification guides to redefine the scope of
national security secrecy in light of current geopolitical and technological reali-
ties. Nothing should ever be classified in the absence of an identifiable threat to
national security. Declassification authority must be extended beyond the origi-
59. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CLAS-
SIFICATION GUIDANCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/class.pdf.
6o. Letter from Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Dir. of the Intelligence Staff, Office of the Dir.
of Nat'l Intelligence to author (Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.fas.org/
blog/secrecy/2oog/o1/odnidenies.html.
61. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Dep'ts & Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685
(Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/
TransparencyandOpenGovernment/.
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originating agency so as to mitigate the tendency toward bureaucratic secrecy.
Other checks and balances on classification could be added to provide oppor-
tunities to identify and correct classification errors. Innovations and experi-
ments in
security policy should be promoted to identify fruitful directions for system-
wide reform. "[TIhere is a tendency to use the classification system to protect
information which is not related to the national security," the Coolidge Com-
mittee observed in 1956, offering a familiar complaint that might have been ut-
tered yesterday. 62 According to its members, "[t]his constitutes an abuse of the
classification system ... and tends to destroy public confidence in the system." 63
A solution to such classification abuse is long overdue, and now is finally within
reach. The benefits of renewed sunlight for the health of our democracy are
likely to be abundant.
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